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Take a game in extensive form with perfect information. 
* *  
Start with an arbitrary choice of strategies by the players. 
Now let each player--if he can --deviate unilaterally to a 
strategy that will improve his payoff, on the assumption that 
the others stay put with their choices. This gives rise to a 
new revised choice of strateqies. Iterate the process. We will 
show that the sequence of strategic choices thus generated 
becomes stationary, and (of course) constitutes a Nash Equi- 
librium (N.E.) of the game. This result is embarrassingly 
simple to prove but seems to us to merit being on record. It 
does somewhat more than re-establish the classical existence 
of anN.E. for such games. It shows that the N.E.'s are 
obtained under the simple dynamic of unilateral strategic 
improvements. Such improvements underlie the very notion of 
an N.E. (which is defined to occur when they cannot be made), 
and so it is natural to use them to set up an associated dyn- 
amic. 
- - - 
* * 
Throughout this note "strategies" will always mean "pure 
strategies". 
Let us quickly recall the definition of the extensive form 
game. (For simplicity we will eliminate chance moves, but our 
result can be shown to hold even then.) There is a tree with 
a finite number of nodes, one of which is distinguished as the 
root (the start of the game). The set of nodes that have no 
* 
followers are called terminal nodes and correspond to end-points 
of the game. The non-terminal nodes are the players' moves. 
Denote by N = il, ..., n) the set of players. Each non-terminal 
node is then labelled by some iEN. Also each i E N  has a (weak) 
preference relation ti on the set of terminal nodes, which is 
assumed to be complete and transitive. (Read "a bi B" as "a is 
liked by i no less than B".) Pi is the strict preference in- 
duced by *i (a ki B if it is not the case that B &i a) . 
A strategy of i E N  is a choice of an (issuing-out) arc at 
each node labelled by him. Put 
si = the set of strategies of player i 
1 n S = S X...XS 
Any s ES gives rise to a path p(s) from the root to some terminal 
node. Define bi on S by s X i  s' if p ( ~ ) + ~  p(sl). An n-tuple 
of strategies ; = , . . . , in S is called a Nash Equilibrium 
( N . E . )  if, for each iEN, 
i (;It) for all t E si 
Here (;It) stands for the n-tuple in S obtained from ; by re- 
, i placing s by t. 
1 Given an s = (s , . . . , sn) E S, player i may deviate to t E S i 
if it improves him, i.e., (slt) Fi s. But such a t may involve 
eccentric behavior by i on irrelevant parts of the game tree. 
For example consider the following 2-person game: 
* 
Node a "follows" node B if B is on the (unique) path con- 
necting the root to a. 
The single arrows give s. Suppose that A p2 BI and D P2 C. 
Then one profitable deviation by 2 is the pair of choices given 
by ((2,~),(2,D)). But there is another, namely {(2,A),(2,C)). 
Since the right branch of the tree is not reached given 1's 
choice at the root, 2 can behave perversely at this node by 
choosing C instead of D. We wish to rule this out. Accord- 
ingly let us define t E si to be an improvement-response to s 
if, for every subgame T having a node of i as its root, 
i The symbol si (tr) stands for the restriction of s (t) to r; 
- 1 
 
n * 
sy - (sr. .... sy). Denote the set of improvement-responses 
Consider an infinite sequence (s (1 ) , . . . , s (R) , . . . ) ,  s (R) = 
1 n 1 n (s ) . . . s  (R)) E S  r . . .x  S , of strategic choices by the 
players. We will say that player i is improving in (s(l), ..., 
s (R) , . . . } if there exists an increasing sequence of integers 
i i t ( 1 ) .  t k , . . . such that 
* 
Note that an improvement-response of i does not require 
-
him to make an improvement in every subgame. In particular 
i i i 
s E I ( s  . always. Perhaps the name "non-disimprovement 
responses" would be better. 
for all k; and 
for ti (k) - < Q < ti (k+l) . This simply says that (i) whenever 
player i changes his strategy it is an improvement to the n-tuple 
of strategies that he is informed about at that time; (ii) any 
change in his information is always an - up-date. Thus, to give 
two extreme cases, i is improving in {s(l), . . . ,  s(L), ... :i if 
s i  = 1 for all L ;  or if S ~ ( ~ + ~ ) E I ~ ( S ( C ) )  for all P .  
Claim: Let {s(l), . . . ,  s(F), . . .  ) be an infinite sequence of 
strategic choices in which each i E N  is improving. Then there 
is an integer L such that s(9.) = s(L) for Q - > L, i.e., the 
sequence becomes stationary. 
Proof: This will be by induction on the number of arcs k in 
- the game tree. If k = 1 the claia is obvious. Assume it to 
be true whenever k < n and take the case k = n+l. 
If {s(l), . . . ,  s(f), . . .  1 does not become stationary, then 
there is a node u, labelled by player i, such that i picks at 
i i least two arcs at a infinitely often in {s (l),...,~ (R), . . .  1 .  
Consider the subgames rl,... ,Trn (m L 2) which start at the end 
of the arcs picked infinitely often at a. In each such r , ,  the 
J 
sequence Is (Q) , . . . l clearly satisfies the hyothesis 
of the claim, hence --by the inductive assumption --becomes sta- 
tionary. But then i would pick only one arc at a infinitely 
often, a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 
So far we have not insisted in the sequence {s(l), . . . ,  s(~),...) 
of the claim that if a player can strictly improve himself, then 
he should do so. Suppose improvements take place as follows. 
In each "round" the players are ranked in some order and called 
upon in turn to make unilateral deviations. Each player i is 
in formed o f  some ( p o s s i b l y  empty)  s u b s e t  o f  t h e  changes  made 
* p r i o r  t o  h i s  t u r n .  Moreover ,  knowing s E S  a t  h i s  t u r n ,  i f  t h e r e  
i s  a  t e li ( s )  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r t y  ( s  1 t )  +i  s,  t h e n  h e  d e v i a t e s  t o  
some such  t .  The c l a i m  a p p l i e s ,  and a f t e r  a  f i n i t e  number o f  
r o u n d s  w e  a r r i v e  a t  a  s t a t i o n a r y  n - t u p l e  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  which 
i s  c l e a r l y  a n  N . E .  T h e r e  i s  no g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  it w i l l  b e  a  
" p e r f e c t "  N . E .  ( i . e .  one  i n  wh ich ,  i n  e a c h  subgame, t h e  re- 
s t r i c t e d  s t r a t e g i e s  form a n  N . E . ) .  TO e n s u r e  c o n v e r g e n c e  t o  
t h a t ,  w e  would have  t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  s t r i c t l y  improve 
( i f  p o s s i b l e )  i n  e a c h  subgame r o o t e d  a t  t h e i r  n o d e s  when t h e i r  
t u r n  comes. 
* 
Indeed  some p l a y e r s  may make s e v e r a l  c h a n g e s  b e f o r e  
o t h e r s .  A l l  w e  need  i s  t h a t  e a c h  p l a y e r  g e t s  a t  l e a s t  o n e  
c h a n c e  t o  change  h i s  s t r a t e g y  i n  e v e r y  round .  
